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THE RULE-MAKING POWER OF OHIO COURTS
The doctrine that courts have inherent power to make rules has been
given new vigor in Ohio by the recent case of State, ex rel. Shube, v. Beck,
17 Ohio Law Abstract 529. (Decided May 14, 1934, in the Stark County
Court of Appeals.) The court unanimously upheld the power of the Stark
County Common Pleas Court to require ten dollars security for costs by rule
of court, on the ground that a court has inherent power to make rules. The
opinion is without citation of authority.
Perhaps one of the reasons for this lack of authority is that Ohio has
been one of the states which has given only lip service to the doctrine of the
inherent rule-making power of courts. On the point in question the Supreme
Court of Ohio had taken the opposite view less than a year before. In a one
sentence opinion the supreme court, feeling itself bound by the case of Cleve-
land Railway Co. v. Halliday, 127 Ohio St. Z78, 188 N. E. I (I933), held
that the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County did not have the power
to demand security for costs by rule of court. Busher v. Macek, 127 Ohio St.
554, 19o N. E. 200. (Decided December 13, 1933.) Weygandt, C. J.,
and Bevis, J., dissented.
The Halliday Case, supra, held that the Common Pleas Court of Cuya-
hoga County had no power to provide by rule of court for a jury of six, instead
of twelve, in civil cases where no "demand for a greater number than six in
writing shall be filed with the Assignment Commissioner before such cases
appear in any active list published on and after April Ix, 1932." The de-
cision was based largely on the fact that jury trial was considered a matter of
substantive right and not procedure. As an additional reason the court, con-
sidering that the reduction of a jury to six virtually amounted to a waiver of
jury, held that inasmuch as the legislature had provided for waiver of jury
in certain instances a court could not add to them. To do so would be in
conflict with the implied will of the legislature that there should be no waiver
except in the instances specified. Since the requirement of security for costs
can not be considered as other than a regulation of procedure, it must be
upon this second ground in the Halliday Case that the Busher Case was based.
The principle of the Busher Case seems to be that when a rule of court con-
flicts with a legislative intent, though it be inferred from the silence or
absence of a statute, the rule is void.
One of the most confusing elements in the consideration of the power
of courts to make rules is the existence of statutes purporting to give the courts
this power. The United States and almost every state have such statutes.
Ohio is particularly unfortunate in this regard in having had such legislation
for over a hundred years. 29 Ohio Laws, 72, 8I (183), 50 Ohio Laws,
68 (1852), 8I Ohio Laws, 170 (1884), 82 Ohio Laws, z1 (1885). For
present enactments see Sections 1473, 1522, 1556, 1558
, 
1698, and io5o-
13, General Code. If the power of the courts to make rules is derived from
the legislature, one may readily concede the proposition that any rule in con-
flict with any express or implied will of the legislature is void. But if the
power to make rules is inherent in the courts, such a view cannot be accepted.
Outside of Ohio there is abundant authority that courts have the inherent
power to make rules. English courts have exercised such power for several
centuries. See in William Tidd, The Practice of the Courts of the King's
Bench and Common Pleas, 9 th ed. (London, i818), p. xxxvii the chrono-
logical table of general rules, orderes and notices. See also p. lxxi.
Two kinds of fact patterns illustrate the inherent power of courts to make
rules.
i. Where no enabling statute grants the power to make rules. In a
decision upholding the validity of the New York rule of court providing for
summary judgments, it was pointed out that the Supreme Court of New York
had exercised the power to make rules for 86 years before there was a state
legislature and for 137 years prior to the enactment of the statute which had
been referred to as the source of the power. Hanna v. Mitchell, zoz App.
Div. 504, x96 N. Y S. 43, 51 (1922). Judgment affirmed in memorandum
opinion, 235 N. Y. 534, 139 N. E. 724 (1923). See also General Investment
Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 235 N. Y. 133, 532, 139 N. E. zi6,
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7Z3 (923). The Courts of Common Pleas and District Courts of Pennsyl-
vania had made rules long before the enactment of any statute on the subject,
as an incident to the power to regulate the pleadings and practice before them.
Harres v. Commonwealth, 35 Pa. 416, 4x8 (186o).
2. Where the statute or constitution which purports to grant such power
to one group of courts, makes no mention of other courts. The Kansas Code
gave express authority to the judges of the supreme court to make rules of
practice applicable to all courts of record. No such authority was granted
to the district courts. A rule of the district cour limited the time within
which cases made shall be noticed for settlement to ten days after the service
of amendments. The rule was held to be a valid exercise of the inherent
power of a court of record. Jones v. Menefee, 28 Kan. 436, 438 (1882).
The converse situation arose in the state of Washington. Its constitution
provides that the judges of the superior courts shall establish uniform rules
for the government of the superior courts. A rule of the supreme court enu-
merated the instances in which the testimony of a witness might be taken by
deposition. This rule was upheld in State, ex rel. Foster-Wyman; Lumber Co.,
v. Supertor Court for King County, 148 Wash. I, z67 Pac. 770 (1928).
The court held the constitutional provision not to be a grant of power to the
superior courts which would deprive the supreme court of similar power, but
a limitation upon the superior courts that required their rules be "uniform."
Such refined reasoning to warp an obvious grant of power into a limitation
upon power shows to what lengths a court will go in order to uphold the
doctrine of inherent power to make rules.
The validity of a rule of court has seldom been successfully challenged
upon the ground that the court had no power to make it, where there was no
statute covering the matter. However that challenge has often been successful
where the provisions of a rule have conflicted with those of a statute regulating
the same subject matter. A leading case is that of Van Ingen v. Berger, 82
Ohio St. 255, 9z N. E. 433, I9 ann. Cas. 799 (1910). In that case a
default judgment was held valid because it satisfied the terms of the statute,
although no notice of the default was given in the Court Index as required by
rule of court. The court held that if a rule of court conflicted with a statute
the rule would be disregarded. This view has been severely criticized on the
bases of logic and policy. John H. Wigmore, "All Legislative Rules for
Judiciary Procedure Are Void Constitutionally," 23 Illinois Law Review,
276 (i9±8).
Aside from the issue of power involved in the conflict between statutes
and rules of court, is the question whether the legislature or the court is more
qualified to regulate practice and procedure. The legislatures of several states
have frankly conceded the superior ability of the courts to handle these mat-
ters by providing that rules of court may supersede statutory regulation of the
same subject matter.
In the recent statute allowing the Supreme Court of the United States to
make uniform rules regulating the practice and procedure in civil actions at
law, Congress provided that "all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no
further force or effect." June i9, 1934, c. 651, No. I, 48 Stat., U. S. C. A.
28 No. 7 z3 b. Such a provision was contained in a bill recommended for
passage in Ohio. Apparently it was unacceptable to the legislature. Report
of Committee to Investigate the Judicial System of Ohio, 1915- Proposed
bill, Sec. 2.
Enactments allowing rules to supersede statutes have been upheld, gener-
ally upon the ground that such rule-making power is inherent in the courts.
Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 300 Pac. 575 (93I) In re Constitutionality
Of Section 251-i8, Wisconsin Statutes, 204 Wis. 501, 236 N. W 717
(193 1), State v Superior Court, supra.
The position of the court in Busher v. Macek, supra, seems to be entirely
unjustified on either authority or reason. Cleveland Railway Co. v. Halliday,
supra, cannot be considered as authority because that case was one involving
substantive rights as distinguished from mere procedure. Nor is the case of
Van ingen v. Berger, supra, authority for the extreme position taken. As has
been seen, the Van Ingen Case involved a direct conflict between the provisions
of a statute and those of a rule of court. The Busher Case goes a step further
by holding invalid a rule of court when in conflict with a legislative intent
inferred from the silence or absence of a statute.
The view taken in the Busher Case, if carried to its logical extreme,
would invalidate the bulk of the rules of court in this state. There are few
subjects not in some way regulated by statute. Under the doctrine of the
Busher Case, it would only be necessary to show that the subject is in some
way regulated by statute. Then, if a rule of court regulates the same subject,
even in an entirely different aspect, the rule would be void because the silence
of the statute on the aspect of the subject regulated by rule must be inferred
to mean a legislative antent that it should not be regulated. The logical im-
plications of such a view should make the supreme court reconsider its position
and support that of State, ex rel. Shube, v. Beck, supra. Until that is done,
procedural reform by rule of court is impossible in Ohio, unless the legislature
authorizes rules of court to supersede procedural statutes.
ABRAHAM GERTNER.
CONCLUSIVENESS OF FINDING OF DATE OF
DEATH OF PRESUMED DECEDENT
Fanny Ernst, mother of George A. Webber, died on September 5, 1930.
Morrissey as administrator of the estate of Webber, a presumed decedent,
made demand of McCorry for the funds held by him as administrator of the
estate of Fanny Ernst. The claim of Morrissey was based on the finding of
the probate court of Hamilton County that the death of George A. Webber
was presumed to have occurred subsequent to the death of his mother.
Smith, guardian of Medina Webber, joined with Walter Webber in this
petition. They alleged that George A. Webber, father of Walter and Medina,
had been absent and unheard from for a period of over eight years antecedent
to the death of his mother; that the presumption of his death arose before the
date of his mother's death, and that Walter and Medina were therefore her
sole heirs and entitled to the proceeds of her estate.
It was held by the Court of Appeals, Fourth District, that the pleading
of the petitioners was suflicient to create a legal presumption that George A.
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